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1 Introduction
The international trading system has experienced a dramatic increase in the number of free
trade agreements (FTAs) in recent decades. Figure 1(a) shows that new FTAs went into force
every year during the period of 1991-2005. In 2004 alone, eighteen new FTAs were established.
A parallel development is the increasing number of FTA partners for each country (Figure
1(b)). In 1991, each nation had on average 1.8 FTA partners. In 2005, the average had risen
to 9.9.
In this paper, we examine how existing FTA relationships a¤ect countries incentives to
form new FTAs. Previous studies have generally viewed the decision to enter into an FTA
as a function of the participating countrieseconomic characteristics alone (e.g., market size,
production cost, and distance), ignoring any potential e¤ect of existing FTAs. Our analysis
shows that a country pairs incentives to establish an FTA with each other depend crucially
on their existing FTA relationships with third countries.
We rst develop a three-country theoretical model to highlight the importance of third-
country e¤ects. In this model, we examine how the incentives of a country pair to enter into
an FTA with each other vary depending on whether the two countries already have existing
FTAs with the third country. We begin with a benchmark "no-FTA" case in which neither
country in the pair has an FTA with the third country. This benchmark case is then compared
with two alternative scenarios: (a) a "one-FTA" case in which only one country in the pair has
an FTA with the third country, and (b) a "two-FTA" case in which both countries in the pair
have FTAs with the third country.1 This comparison enables us to show how existing FTAs
inuence a country pairs decision to establish an FTA with each other and how the e¤ect
varies with the structure of existing FTA relationships.
Comparing the one-FTA case with the benchmark, we nd that when only one country
in the pair has a pre-existing FTA, that country has an unambiguously stronger incentive to
form a new FTA with the other country in the pair. But the incentive for the other country
(without a pre-existing FTA) to join the agreement is strictly lower. The theoretical results
suggest that the country pair will jointly support an FTA only if the country with a pre-existing
FTA o¤ers a su¢ ciently attractive export market, which requires the country to have relatively
large market size, a high-cost domestic rm, and low transport costs. Comparing the two-FTA
case with the benchmark, we nd that the incentives to enter into an FTA with each other are
unambiguously stronger for both countries when they both have pre-existing FTAs with the
third country.
The theoretical results can be explained by examining the trade-o¤s involved from forming
1As an example of the one-FTA case, consider the U.S., South Korea, and Mexico. The U.S. has an FTA
with Mexico since 1994, while South Korea does not have FTA with Mexico. An example of the two-FTA case
includes the U.S., Chile, and Mexico. As of 1999, both the U.S. and Chile had an FTA with Mexico even though
the two did not have an FTA with each other until 2004.
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an FTA. When a country pair establishes an FTA, both countries experience gains in export
prot and consumer surplus as well as reductions in home prot and tari¤ revenue. The country
pair will jointly support the FTA only if the net welfare change is positive for each country.
Our analysis shows that the magnitude of the net welfare change depends on whether the
two countries already have pre-existing FTAs with a third country. Two third-country e¤ects
are particularly important in determining the net welfare change. The rst e¤ect is a loss
sharing e¤ect and applies to countries with a pre-existing FTA. When a country already has a
pre-existing FTA, the fall in its home-market prot from forming a new FTA will be smaller
because part of the prot reduction is deected to its existing FTA partner. The second e¤ect
is a concession erosion e¤ect. It applies to countries whose potential FTA partner has a pre-
existing FTA. A pre-existing FTA of the potential partner reduces the export prot gain that
a country can achieve from a new FTA.
In the one-FTA case where only one country in the pair has a pre-existing FTA, that
countrys rm will achieve the same gain in export prot as in the benchmark case when the
country forms a new FTA. But the decrease in its home-market prot will be smaller due to
the loss sharing e¤ect. This raises the incentive of the country to form a new FTA relative to
the benchmark case. In contrast, the incentive for the other country in the pair (without a
pre-existing FTA) to join the agreement is strictly lower than the benchmark since its rm will
experience the same loss in home prot but a smaller gain in export prot due to the concession
erosion e¤ect. In the two-FTA case where two countries both have pre-existing FTAs with the
third country, both countries are symmetrically a¤ected by the loss sharing and concession
erosion e¤ects. The net e¤ect of the existing FTAs is to raise both countriesincentive to enter
into an FTA with each other relative to the benchmark case.
Our empirical results are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions. We estimate
countriesdecision to form an FTA with each other as a function of not only their economic
characteristics but also their existing FTAs with third countries. The results provide strong ev-
idence that existing FTA relationships signicantly a¤ect countriesincentives to establish new
FTAs. Countries with similar economic characteristics but di¤erent FTA structures display
strikingly di¤erent propensities to form new FTAs. Accounting for third-country e¤ects signi-
cantly raises the predictive ability of the empirical model, increasing the number of successfully
predicted FTAs by 31 percent.
Our paper builds on a large body of theoretical literature that examines the determinants
of FTA formation (e.g., Baldwin, 1999; Bond et al., 2004; Bond and Syropoulos, 1996; Frankel,
1997; Furusawa and Konishi, 2007; Krugman, 1991; Yi, 1996).2 Ethier (1998), Bagwell and
Staiger (2004), and Goyal and Joshi (2006), in particular, have anticipated the "concession ero-
sion" e¤ect we identify here. Bagwell and Staiger (2004) show, for example, that the formation
2A thorough review of the theoretical literature is beyond the scope of this paper. We limit our discussion to
studies that are particularly relevant to our paper. See Krishna (2004) and Baier, Bergstrand and Egger (2007)
for excellent surveys of the literature.
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of trade agreements between two countries can erode the value of concessions to an outsider
country because of adverse movement in the outsiders terms of trade.3 This hypothesis has
not been examined empirically and this study seeks to ll that gap.4
Our paper is also closely related to the growing empirical literature on FTA formation.
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Magee (2003) are the rst studies to estimate the economic
determinants of FTAs. Both papers nd that trade creation is a major motive for forming FTAs.
They show that countries with relatively similar market size, similar factor endowments, and
geographic proximity are more likely to have FTAs in place. A recent study by Egger and
Larch (2008) extends the literature by estimating the spatial relationship of preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) including both customs unions and FTAs. In particular, they focus on the
enlargement of existing PTAs, such as the EU and NAFTA, and the formation of new PTAs
between outsider countries. Our paper di¤ers from Egger and Larch (2008) in three ways. First,
we examine the e¤ect of countriesexisting FTAs on their incentives to establish new FTAs.
Second, we allow the e¤ect of existing FTAs to vary with the structure of FTA relationships.
Finally, we o¤er evidence on third countries potential loss sharing and concession erosion
e¤ects and investigate the conditions under which each type of FTA relationship generates a
positive e¤ect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a three-country theoretical model and
derives the papers main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data to be used in the empirical
analysis. Section 4 presents the econometric framework and empirical evidence. Section 5
discusses sensitivity analyses and Section 6 examines the predictive ability of the empirical
model. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we construct a three-country theoretical model to examine how a country pairs
incentives to form an FTA with each other depend on that country pairs existing FTA relation-
ships with a third country.5 We rst analyze a benchmark case, denoted as F0, in which neither
country in the pair has an FTA with the third country. This benchmark case is then compared
3Bagwell and Staiger (2004) obtain the "concession erosion" e¤ect using a perfectly competitive general-
equilibrium model, while we show the same result in a standard Cournot setting (see Krishna, 1998; Freund,
2000; Ornelas, 2005; Saggi, 2006; Goyal and Joshi, 2006 for other FTA studies using Cournot models). This
implies that concession erosion is a robust phenomenon that is not exclusive to a specic type of theoretical
model.
4Our paper is also related to the theoretical work of Aghion, Antras and Helpman (2007), who address
the potential externalities in sequential negotiation of FTAs. Their focus, however, is on how the structure of
coalition externalities shapes countries choices between sequential and multilateral bargaining. Their results
indicate that the leading country strictly prefers sequential bargaining when the coalition externalities are
negative in at least one of the follower countries and multilateral bargaining when the coalition externalities are
positive in both follower countries.
5 In an earlier working paper version of our paper (Chen and Joshi, 2009), we o¤ered additional analysis
dealing with endogenous MFN tari¤s and N countries. The main implications of the model are similar.
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with two alternative scenarios: (a) a one-FTA case, denoted as F1, in which one country has an
FTA with the third country but the other country does not, and (b) a two-FTA case, denoted
as F2, in which both countries have FTAs with the third country. This comparison shows how
existing FTAs inuence the country pairs decision to establish a new FTA with each other.
2.1 Basic setup
Each country produces two homogeneous goods, x and y, with constant returns to scale tech-
nologies. Good xs market is oligopolistic, while good ys market is perfectly competitive. Good
y is freely traded across countries and serves as the numeraire.
Consumerspreferences over the two goods are represented by a quasilinear utility function,
Ui(Xi; Yi) = ui(Xi) + Yi, where Xi and Yi denote, respectively, the aggregate consumption of
good x and good y in country i. Assuming ui(Xi) has a quadratic form, this utility function
generates a linear demand function for good x, Pi(Xi) = i  Xi, where Pi(Xi) is country is
inverse demand and i > 0 denotes country is market size.
There is one rm in each country (also indexed by i) that produces good x at constant
marginal cost i. We allow the marginal costs to di¤er across countries. Firms face unit specic
trade costs, including both transport cost and tari¤, when they export to foreign countries;
 ij and Tij denote, respectively, the levels of transport cost and tari¤ required to export one
unit of x from country i to country j with  ii = 0 and Tii = 0. We assume that the transport
costs are symmetric for each pair of countries, i.e.,  ij =  ji, while tari¤s can be asymmetric
between two countries.
The binary variable gij 2 f0; 1g denotes whether an FTA exists between countries i and j.
This binary variable takes the value 1 if the given country pair has an FTA and 0 otherwise;
by denition, gij = gji. When there is an FTA between a country pair, tari¤s are zero between
that pair. For all other country pairs, the importing country sets a non-discriminatory tari¤
Ti. We assume the tari¤ to be non-prohibitive so that rms from each country sell to all three
markets. The e¤ective tari¤ imposed by country i on country j, i.e., Tij , can be expressed as
Ti(1  gij).
Firms compete as Cournot oligopolists and treat each country as a separate market. Each
rms objective in its home market is to maximize the domestic prot given by:
ii = (Pi   i)xii; (1)
where ii and xii represent the prot and output, respectively, of rm i in market i. In a
foreign market, say country j, a rm maximizes
ij = [Pj   i    ij   Tj(1  gij)]xij ; (2)
where ij and xij represent the prot and output, respectively, of rm i in market j. The
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Cournot-Nash equilibrium output of each rm in its home market is given by:
xii =
1
4
"
i   3i +
P
l 6=i
(l +  li + Ti(1  gli))
#
; (3)
and the corresponding prot by ii = xii2. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium output in each
foreign market is given by:
xij =
1
4
"
j   3 (i +  ij + Tj(1  gij)) +
P
l 6=i
(l +  lj + Tj(1  glj))
#
(4)
and the corresponding prot by ij = xij2.
The prot function exhibits several important properties with respect to FTAs. First,
consider the home-market prot. Let ni denote the number of foreign countries with which a
country has an FTA, i.e., ni 
P
l 6=i gli. Then, given equation (3), each rms home-market
prot can be written as
ii =
1
16
"
i   3i +
P
l 6=i
(l +  li + Ti)  niTi
#2
: (5)
Examining equation (5), we rst observe that the home-market prot is strictly decreasing
in the home countrys number of FTAs. When the home country forms an FTA with a foreign
country, it removes the tari¤ on the foreign rm and increases the level of imports. The
increased import competition lowers the domestic rms prot in the home market.
Equation (5) also indicates that the home-market prot is a strictly convex function of the
home countrys number of FTAs. In other words, the decrease in the domestic rms home-
market prot from a new FTA will be smaller when the home country already has an FTA
with a third country. The reason is that when there is an existing FTA between the home and
a third country, the third-country rm will have a larger market share in the home country
than if there were no existing FTA. As a result, when the home country forms a new FTA,
the third-country rm will also absorb a larger share of the domestic prot loss. We label this
e¤ect as a third-country loss sharing e¤ect.6
Export prots also vary systematically with the pattern of FTAs. A rm will earn a greater
prot in a foreign market when the foreign country signs an FTA with the home country and
grants that rm preferential market access. But this gain in export prot is smaller when the
foreign country already has an FTA with a third country. This is because the third countrys
pre-existing preferential market access to the foreign country dilutes the potential prot gain
that the new partner countrys rm can achieve by also gaining preferential market access.
6This result has also been anticipated by Krishna (1998), who points out that an FTA is more likely to gain
political support when there is a greater volume of imports from third countries.
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This e¤ect has also been noted in Ethier (1998), Bagwell and Staiger (2004), and Goyal and
Joshi (2006). We label it as the third-country concession erosion e¤ect.7
The aggregate consumption in each country is given by Xi = xii +
P
l 6=i xli, where xii
and xli are dened in equations (3) and (4). Given the inverse demand function Pi(Xi), each
countrys consumer surplus is CSi = Xi2=2, and is strictly increasing in the number of FTAs
formed by the country. The tari¤ revenue of each country is given by
P
l 6=i Ti(1   gli)xli and
decreases when the country forms a new FTA.
The total welfare of each country is dened as the sum of consumer surplus, producer
prots, and tari¤ revenue, i.e.,
Wi = CSi + ii +
P
l 6=i
il +
P
l 6=i
Ti(1  gli)xli: (6)
We assume that two countries will engage in an FTA if and only if the agreement raises the
welfare of both countries.
2.2 The benchmark case
We now examine how the decision of two countries, denoted as i and j, to form an FTA with
each other depends on their existing FTA relationships with the third country. We begin with
the benchmark case F0 in which neither country has an FTA with the third country (shown in
Figure 2(a)). Country i will be willing to form an FTA with country j, given F0, if and only
if its welfare increases after the new FTA:
Wi(gij = 1jF0) > Wi(gij = 0jF0): (7.a)
Similarly, country j will be willing to form an FTA with country i if and only if
Wj(gij = 1jF0) > Wj(gij = 0jF0): (7.b)
These conditions require that for both countries i and j, the increase in consumer surplus and
export prot o¤set the loss in home-market prot and tari¤ revenue.
Let
 ij 
6Tj(j + k   3 ij + kj   Tj=2)  Ti(3i + 7k   9 ij + 7ki + Ti=2)
18Tj   Ti
'ij  (6Tj + 9Ti)=(18Tj   Ti);
7While the theoretical setup adopted here is fairly standard in the literature (see Krishna, 1998; Freund,
2000; Ornelas, 2005; Saggi, 2006; Goyal and Joshi, 2006 for other FTA studies using a similar setup), Goyal and
Joshi (2006) show that the above properties of the prot function are not exclusive to the adopted framework
and also obtain under fairly general demand and cost specications and with each country having more than
one rm.
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and similarly for  ji and 'ji. Conditions (7.a) and (7.b) are, respectively, equivalent to:
i <  ij + 'ij  j (8.a)
j <  ji + 'ji  i: (8.b)
Conditions (8.a) and (8.b) capture in compact form the parametric ranges under which
countries i and j, respectively, are willing to form an FTA with each other. Condition (8.a)
states that, ceteris paribus, country i will have an incentive to form an FTA with j if and only
if is marginal cost of production (i) is below some threshold value dened as a linear function
of country js marginal cost (j). An analogous condition for country j is shown in (8.b). To
satisfy both conditions, the di¤erence in countries i and js marginal costs must be within an
intermediate range.
Examining conditions (8.a) and (8.b) and, in particular, the components of  ij and  ji also
allows us to evaluate the role of the other parameters in i and js decision to form an FTA. For
example, country is incentive to form an FTA increases in country js market size (j) but
decreases in its own (i). As a result, countries will have incentives to enter into an FTA with
each other when they have relatively large and similar market sizes. With respect to transport
costs, when tari¤s Ti and Tj are su¢ ciently similar (Tj=2 < Ti < 2Tj) countries with a lower
transport cost  ij are more likely to experience a welfare increase from an FTA.
These results are also the main predictions of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and are sum-
marized below:
Proposition 1 In the benchmark case where there is no FTA with the third country, countries
i and j will have incentives to form an FTA with each other when they have (a) relatively large
and similar market sizes, (b) su¢ ciently similar marginal costs, and (c) low transport costs.
2.3 The one-FTA case
Next we examine countries i and js decision to enter into an FTA in the one-FTA case F1
where i already has an FTA with the third country but j does not (shown in Figure 2(b)),
and contrast it with the benchmark case F0. This allows us to establish the role of the third
country when only one country in a pair has an existing FTA with the third country. Countries
i and j will be willing to form an FTA with each other given F1 if and only if the following
conditions hold for i and j, respectively:
Wi(gij = 1jF1) > Wi(gij = 0jF1) (9.a)
Wj(gij = 1jF1) > Wj(gij = 0jF1): (9.b)
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Conditions (9.a)-(9.b) are, respectively, equivalent to:
i <  ij + 'ij  j + i(F1) (10.a)
j <  ji + 'ji  i + j(F1); (10.b)
where
i(F1)  11T 2i =(18Tj   Ti), j(F1)   6T 2i =(18Ti   Tj):
Compared to conditions (8.a) and (8.b) in the benchmark case, conditions (10.a) and (10.b)
have two new additive terms, i(F1) and j(F1). These two terms capture the e¤ect of country
is existing FTA with the third country on countries i and js incentives to establish an FTA
with each other. When countries i and js tari¤s are su¢ ciently similar, i.e., Tj=18 < Ti < 18Tj ,
we have i(F1) > 0 and j(F1) < 0. This indicates that the parametric range in which country
i is willing to form an FTA with country j is strictly greater relative to the benchmark case,
while the range for j to reciprocate the FTA is unambiguously smaller. In other words, is
incentive to form an FTA with j is strictly greater when it already has an FTA with the third
country while js incentive to reciprocate the agreement is strictly lower.
This di¤ering e¤ect is due to the asymmetric impact of the third country on i and j. When
country i already has an FTA with the third country, country is rm will experience the same
gain in export prot from a new FTA as in the benchmark case, but a smaller decrease in home-
market prot. This latter result is the third-country loss sharing e¤ect described in Section
2.1 and makes an FTA with country j more attractive to country i. The loss sharing e¤ect is
further complemented by a smaller decrease in country is tari¤ revenue. Because country is
FTA with the third country lowers country is imports from country j, country is potential
tari¤ revenue loss from forming an FTA with country j is smaller. The e¤ect of the third
country is opposite on js incentive to form an FTA with i. Country js rm will experience
the same loss in home prot from a new FTA as in the benchmark case, but a smaller gain in
export prot in is market due to the third countrys existing preferential market access. This
is the concession erosion e¤ect discussed in Section 2.1 and makes an FTA with country i less
attractive to country j.
Given the opposing e¤ects of the third country on countries i and j, it is important to
delineate the conditions under which both i and j will agree to form an FTA. Since country is
incentive to form an FTA with country j is strengthened relative to the benchmark case, it is
js decision to reciprocate that is now binding. In order for the FTA to be welfare enhancing
for country j, it will need su¢ ciently high export prot in is market to o¤set the concession
erosion e¤ect. This requires country i to have a su¢ ciently large market size (i), high marginal
cost of production (i), and low transport cost ( ji).
8 We summarize these results below:
8Note that to complete the discussion, we also established the conditions under which both country i and
the third country are strictly better o¤ relative to the benchmark case. This is required to ensure that is FTAs
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Proposition 2 In the one-FTA case, where country i already has an FTA with the third
country and country j does not:
(a) country is incentive to form an FTA with j is strictly greater than in the benchmark
case while country js incentive to form an FTA with i is strictly smaller;
(b) countries i and j will jointly support an FTA if (1) country i has a su¢ ciently large
market size relative to country j, (2) country i has su¢ ciently high marginal costs relative to
country j, and (3) transport costs between i and j are relatively low.
2.4 The two-FTA case
Lastly, we examine countries i and js decision to form an FTA in the two-FTA case F2 where
both i and j already have an FTA with the third country (shown in Figure 2(c)), and contrast
it with the benchmark case F0. Country i and j will be willing to form an FTA with each
other given F2 if and only if:
Wi(gij = 1jF2) > Wi(gij = 0jF2) (11.a)
Wj(gij = 1jF2) > Wj(gij = 0jF2): (11.b)
Conditions (11.a) and (11.b) are, respectively, equivalent to:
i <  ij + 'ij  j + i(F2) (12.a)
j <  ji + 'ji  i + j(F2); (12.b)
where
i(F2)  (11T 2i   6T 2j )=(18Tj   Ti), j(F2)  (11T 2j   6T 2i )=(18Ti   Tj).
Compared to conditions (8.a) and (8.b) in the benchmark case, (12.a) and (12.b) have two
additional terms, i(F2) and j(F2). These terms capture the e¤ect of both countries having
an existing FTA with the third country. When Ti and Tj are su¢ ciently similar (
p
6Ti=
p
11 <
Tj <
p
11Ti=
p
6),9 we have i(F2) > 0 and j(F2) > 0. The range of parametric values such
that both countries i and j are willing to form an FTA with each other is unambiguously larger
relative to the benchmark case.
This is because the third country a¤ects i and j symmetrically in this scenario. First,
the third countrys FTAs with i and j decrease the pairs potential prot loss at home when
with both country j and the third country are a subgame-perfect outcome in settings where we allow countries
to be forward-looking (such as the model of Dutta et al, 2005). In other words, it ensures that the third country
will have an incentive to form an FTA with i even when it foresees the FTA between i and j. The conditions
are described in Chen and Joshi (2009).
9As shown in Appendix A of Chen and Joshi (2009) where MFN tari¤s are endogenously determined, this
condition is satised for countries with similar market size and similar marginal cost of production, both of
which are required for an FTA to be jointly supported.
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they form an FTA with each other. This is the loss sharing e¤ect described in Section 2.1.
Second, the third countrys FTAs with i and j decrease the pairs potential tari¤ revenue loss
from entering into an FTA. Both the loss sharing and the tari¤ revenue e¤ects only applied
to country i in the one-FTA case (when country i has an FTA with the third country and
country j does not), but are now applicable to both i and j. In addition to these e¤ects,
the third countrys FTAs with i and j also dilute the potential prot gain the latter two can
achieve in each others market. This concession erosion e¤ect was experienced by country j
only in the one-FTA case, but now applies to both i and j. The theoretical results suggest that
the concession erosion is o¤set by the loss sharing and the tari¤ revenue e¤ects; consequently,
countries i and j have an unambiguously stronger incentive to form an FTA with each other.
We summarize this nding in:
Proposition 3 In the two-FTA case, where both countries i and j have an FTA with the third
country, the incentives for countries i and j to form an FTA with each other are strictly greater
than in the benchmark case.
3 Data
We employ a panel data of 78 countries and 3003 country pairs to evaluate the theoretical
predictions outlined above.10 We obtain the FTA status of each country pair for the period of
1991-2005 using the Tuck Trade Agreements Database and WTO Regional Trade Agreements
Database.11 The FTA information is used to identify (a) countriesdecision to enter into an
FTA at a given time, and (b) existing FTA relationships with third countries. Given the limited
annual variation in the data, we dene every three years as one time period.12
As in the theoretical model, we consider three types of third-country relationships for each
pair of countries in each time period: (a) the benchmark case in which there is no FTA between
the country pair and a third country; (b) the one-FTA case in which one country in the pair
has an existing FTA with a third country; (c) the two-FTA case in which both countries have
FTAs with a common third country. Note that all three types of third-country relationships
can coexist for some country pairs. Consider, for example, Germany (or any other EU member)
and Mexico. Mexico has an FTA with the U.S. while Germany does not. In the meantime,
both Germany and Mexico have FTAs with Israel. We discuss how we construct variables for
each type of third-country relationship in Section 4.
10The country coverage is determined mainly by the availability of data on economic characteristics, such as
labor cost. Appendix 1 reports the country list.
11While the focus of this paper is on the formation of FTAs, we control for the potential e¤ect of customs
union membership on countriesincentives to enter into an FTA in the empirical analysis. To this end, we also
collect the customs union membership status of each country in each period.
12For example, FTAs implemented between 1991 and 1993 are considered to enter into force in the same
period.
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Three main economic characteristics are considered for each country: (a) market size ();
(b) marginal cost of production (); and (c) transport costs ().13 Countries GDP, ob-
tained from the World Development Indicators (WDI), proxies for market size. Each countrys
weighted average real unit labor cost is used as a measure of marginal cost of production.14
The average real unit labor cost is constructed by weighing each industry by its share of na-
tional output. This variable captures not only a countrys real wage rate but also its level of
labor productivity. Labor cost and output data are taken from the World Bank Trade and
Production Database, which covers a larger number of countries compared to sources such as
International Labor Organization (ILO) and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Fi-
nally, the distance between each country pairs capital cities is used as a proxy for transport
cost, with data taken from the City Distance Calculator provided by VulcanSoft.
4 Econometric Framework and Results
Now we describe the econometric framework used in the empirical analysis and the empirical
results. Propositions 1-3 in Section 2 form the basis of the hypotheses in our econometric
framework. We evaluate each of the hypotheses below.
4.1 E¤ect of country-pair economic characteristics
The rst hypothesis we examine empirically follows directly from Proposition 1 in Section 2.2.
It predicts that two countries will have incentives to form an FTA with each other in the
benchmark case when they have relatively large and similar market sizes, su¢ ciently similar
marginal costs, and low transport costs. This prediction, which is also the main hypothesis of
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Magee (2003), constitutes our baseline empirical specication.
It has not taken into account the e¤ect of existing FTA relationships.
To evaluate the rst hypothesis, we use the following baseline equation:
Pr(gijt = 1) = 
 
X 0ijt 1 + "ijt

: (13)
where gijt  gijt   gijt 1 is the binary dependent variable that takes the value 1 if countries
13 Ideally, we would also like to include countrieslagged MFN tari¤ rates, as they, too, can a¤ect countries
incentives to engage in FTAs. But because of the large number of missing values in panel tari¤ data, including
this variable would substantially reduce the sample size. In Section 5.1, we address the potential bias that can
arise in the absence of this variable by including country-period (and partner-period) xed e¤ects and controlling
for all time-variant country-specic characteristics.
14As an alternative, we also followed Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Magee (2003) in using countries
di¤erences in factor endowment ratios as a measure of di¤erences in comparative advantage. The results were
qualitatively similar to the ndings presented here. However, since this measure does not take into account
countriesdi¤erences in factor productivity (see, Treer, 1993; Davis and Weinstein, 2001; Maskus and Nishioka,
2009), we adopt real unit labor costs as the measure for our reported regressions.
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i and j enter into an FTA in period t and 0 otherwise,15 (:) is the cumulative probability
function, X 0ijt 1 is a vector of explanatory variables, and "ijt is the vector of residuals.
16 All
the explanatory variables are lagged by one period to mitigate endogeneity concerns.17
We consider a specication of X 0ijt 1 similar to Baier and Bergstrand (2004):
X 0ijt 1 = 0 +
1
2
1(it 1 + jt 1) + 2jit 1   jt 1j+ 3jit 1   jt 1j
+4jit 1   jt 1j2 + 5 ij + 6row;t 1 +
1
2
7
P
l=i;j
 row;l:
The Xijt 1 vector consists of the following country-pair economic characteristics. It includes,
rst, the country pairs average market size, (it 1 + jt 1)=2, measured by GDP, with the
expectation that countriesaverage market size is positively correlated with their probability
of entering into an FTA, i.e., 1 > 0. It also includes the absolute value of the di¤erence in
GDP between the country pair, jit 1   jt 1j, because Proposition 1 suggests that countries
with relatively similar market sizes are more likely to establish an agreement, i.e., 2 < 0. In
addition, the vector incorporates di¤erence between the country pair in marginal production
costs, in both absolute and squared values. Countries are expected to be more likely to form
an FTA when their dissimilarity in costs, i.e., jit 1   jt 1j, is within an intermediate range,
i.e., 3 > 0 and 4 < 0. The e¤ect of distance, i.e.,  ij , is also captured in X
0
ijt 1 and
expected to be negative. Finally, following Baier and Bergstrand (2004), Xijt 1 includes third
countriesaverage marginal cost, denoted as row;t 1, and average distance from the country
pair, denoted as
P
l=i;j  row;l=2, even though the e¤ect of these variables is ambiguous.
18 The
summary statistics of the above variables are reported in the upper panel of Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
Column (1) of Table 2 reports the estimates of equation (13). The evidence is broadly con-
sistent with the expectations from Proposition 1.19 Countries with larger and relatively similar
market sizes are signicantly more likely to enter into an FTA with each other. For example,
a 100-percent increase in countriesaverage GDP leads to 0.5 percentage point increase in the
15Since the establishment of an FTA between a country pair is an unrepeated event, country pairs that already
formed an FTA before period t would not be considered when constructing the dependent variable in period t.
16We adopt in this section a xed-e¤ect logit model that controls for all time-specic factors. We also
considered a Cox proportional hazards model and found the results were largely similar. A probit model is not
used here because of the incidental parameter problem that would arise with the use of xed e¤ects. In Section
5, we consider alternative estimators, such as including country-pair and country-period xed e¤ects, to control
for potential omitted variables.
17While the time lag helps reduce potential endogeneity, we adopt an additional measure in Section 5.2 to
further address the issue.
18We follow Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and take into account whether the country pair is in the same
continent. If they are, we use their average distance to the rest of the world as a measure of remoteness.
Otherwise, we assume the value to be 0.
19The second column of Table 2 (and the following tables) summarizes our hypotheses.
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probability of an FTA.20 Countries are also more likely to form an FTA when their di¤erence
in marginal costs is within an intermediate range. The probability of an FTA initially increases
by 0.2 percentage point when countriesdi¤erence in unit labor costs increases by 100 percent
and reaches the peak around the unit labor cost di¤erences of country pairs such as Belgium
and Chile. Distance has an adverse impact: the probability of entering into an FTA is 2 per-
centage points lower for countries that are 100 percent farther apart. Finally, countries are
more likely to enter into an agreement when the rest of the world has relatively competitive
unit labor costs.
[Table 2 about here]
4.2 E¤ect of existing FTA relationships
We now consider the e¤ect of existing FTA relationships with third countries. The next hy-
pothesis we examine empirically follows directly from Proposition 2 in Section 2.3 and examines
the conditions under which two countries will form an FTA with each other when one of them
has an existing FTA with a third country. Proposition 2 predicts that when country i has an
FTA with a third country, say k, but country j does not, countries i and j are more likely to
establish an FTA when country i has a su¢ ciently large market size and high marginal cost
relative to country j and the transport cost between the two is relatively low.
To evaluate this hypothesis, we add a new vector of variables, X 01;ijt 1  I(F1;ijt 1), to
equation (13) where I(F1;ijt 1) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if country i has an FTA
with a third country k but country j does not. This gives us the following specication:
Pr(gijt = 1) = 
h
X 0ijt 1 +X
0
1;ijt 1e  I(F1;ijt 1) + "ijti : (14)
In the above equation, X 01;ijt 1e is given by
X 01;ijt 1e = e0 + e1 (it 1   jt 1) + e2  it 1   jt 1+ e3 ij ;
where e0 is a constant, it 1   jt 1 represents the (relative) market-size di¤erence between i
and j, it 1   jt 1 measures the (relative) marginal-cost di¤erence between the two, and  ij
measures the distance. In contrast with X 0ijt 1 where i and j enter the expression symmetri-
cally, the terms in X 01;ijt 1e measure the extent by which is market size and production cost
exceeds js. Proposition 2 suggests that e1 > 0, e2 > 0, and e3 < 0.
It is noteworthy that in some cases both countries i and j have FTAs with separate third
countries. Chen and Joshi (2009) provide a formal analysis of this case. The result is analogous
to Proposition 2 in Section 2.3. The country that has FTAs with a relatively larger number
20The elasticity estimates discussed in the text are derived from the logit coe¢ cients reported in the tables
and evaluated at the means.
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of third countries has a stronger incentive to form a new FTA, but the incentive of the other
country, i.e., the country that has FTAs with a smaller number of third countries, is strictly
smaller. Similarly, an FTA is more likely to be jointly supported when the country with more
existing FTA partners has a su¢ ciently large market size and high marginal cost of production
relative to the other country.21
The lower panel of Table 1 reports summary statistics for X 01;ijt 1I(F1;ijt 1). Among
country pairs that formed an FTA, the country that had a pre-existing FTA with a third
country (or a larger number of third countries) tends to have a relatively larger market size
and higher unit labor cost than the other country in the pair.
Column (2) of Table 2 reports the estimation results.22 It is evident that the decision to
establish an FTA is crucially dependent on countries existing FTA relationships with third
countries. The net parameter of the dummy variable I(F1;ijt 1), based on the four regressors in
X 01;ijt 1I(F1;ijt 1), is positive and statistically signicant. The probability that a country pair
will establish an FTA is, on average, 0.5 percentage point higher when one of the countries has
an existing FTA with a third country. To put this e¤ect in perspective, the average predicted
probability that a country pair will enter into an FTA when neither has an FTA with a third
country is 0.01. Consistent with the predictions of Proposition 2, a country pair is more likely
to support an FTA when the country with existing FTAs has a larger market size and higher
unit labor cost relative to the country without.23
We next evaluate predictions of Proposition 3, which involves the case in which both coun-
tries i and j have an FTA with a common third country. Proposition 3 suggests that the
incentive for countries i and j to establish an FTA is strictly greater in this scenario than in
the benchmark case.
To evaluate this prediction, we include an indicator variable, I(F2;ijt 1), in equation (14)
21We also considered two other treatments: (i) comparing the aggregate market size (instead of number) of
two countriesFTA partners, and (ii) separating cases in which only one of the countries has existing FTAs
from cases in which both countries have FTAs with di¤erent third countries. The results were similar and are
available upon request.
22Even though our theory focuses on the role of existing FTA relationships and does not explicitly address
the e¤ect of customs unions, we control for the latter throughout the empirical analysis by including a dummy
for each existing customs union. The estimated parameters of the customs union controls suggest that customs
union members have a greater probability to form new FTAs with nonmembers. This positive e¤ect of customs
union is to some extent similar to the case of existing FTAs with third countries. Both types of agreements
reduce member countriespotential losses at home when they form new FTAs. The agreements also dilute outside
countriespotential prot gains in the member countries after they enter into an FTA. However, forming an
FTA with a customs union member means obtaining market access to the entire union and thus o¤ers more
incentives. Since these results are not the main focus of the paper, they were suppressed in the tables but are
available from the authors.
23When both countries have FTAs with di¤erent third countries, this result (and analogously for the following
results) suggests that two countries are more likely to enter into an FTA when the country with a larger number
of FTA partners has a su¢ ciently large market size and labor cost relative to the one with fewer partners. For
expositional clarity, we discuss our results in the context of the scenario considered in Section 2.
15
and obtain
Pr(gijt = 1) = 

X 0ijt 1 +X
0
1;ijt 1e  I(F1;ijt 1) + ee  I(F2;ijt 1) + "ijt : (15)
The indicator variable I(F2;ijt 1) equals 1 when both countries i and j have FTAs with a
common third country k at period t   1 and 0 otherwise. The parameter of I(F2;ijt 1),
denoted by ee, is expected to be positive. The summary statistics reported in Table 1 suggest
that compared to the rest of the world, the percentage of country pairs that share common
FTA partners is signicantly greater among those that eventually entered into an FTA.
The last two columns of Table 2 report the parameter estimates of equation (15). The
results suggest that relative to the benchmark case where there are no FTAs with third coun-
tries, countries are signicantly more likely to establish an FTA when they have existing FTAs
with the same third country. The likelihood increases by 2 percentage points on average.24
This nding is also illustrated in Figure 3, where we plot the distribution of countriestted
probabilities of forming FTAs. The distribution is shifted signicantly rightward for countries
that have existing FTAs with the same third countries.
[Figure 3 about here]
4.3 E¤ect of third-country characteristics
So far we have established the e¤ect of FTA relationships on countries incentive to form a
new FTA. But how does the e¤ect vary with third-country characteristics? The theoretical
framework employed in this paper, albeit standard in the FTA literature, does not have direct
predictions in this respect because of the linearity assumptions of cost and demand. But third-
country characteristics can a¤ect the extent of the third-country e¤ects when non-linearities
are present. We explore this issue empirically.
Similar to the country-pair characteristics, we take into account three third-country at-
tributes: (i) market size; (ii) unit labor cost; and (iii) distance to the partner country in the
country pair. In particular, for the case in which country i has an FTA with a third country
k and country j does not, we calculate the cost di¤erence between k and j, i.e., kt 1   jt 1.
Proposition 2 in Section 2.3 predicts that given the FTA between countries i and k, country j
is more likely to form an FTA with i when is marginal cost of production is high relative to
js. An implication of this result is that the FTA between i and k will be less likely to dampen
country js incentive to enter into an FTA with i when k is also relatively less competitive
than j. The reason is straightforward: less e¢ cient third countries are less capable of diluting
24We also interacted I(F2;ijt 1) with Xijt 1 to explore whether the e¤ect of country-pair characteristics might
vary given common FTA partners. We found that all interaction terms have a positive and signicant parameter,
suggesting that, at any given level of Xijt 1, sharing a common FTA partner increases countriesprobability of
entering into an FTA.
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country js potential prot gain in country is market.
[Table 3 about here]
The estimates in Table 3 are consistent with the above hypothesis. The probability that
a country pair will enter into an FTA increases in third countriesunit labor costs when the
third countries have existing FTAs with either one or both of the countries in the country pair.
5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we address two econometric concerns that can arise in the analysis and examine
the robustness of the results. First, there may exist omitted variables that also a¤ect countries
decisions to enter into an FTA. The other econometric issue involves the causality of existing
FTAs. Countries might self-select into their existing FTA relationships because the agreements
help enable future FTAs.
5.1 Omitted variables
To address the omitted variables concern, we employ various xed e¤ects. In column (1) of
Table 4, we include a country-pair xed e¤ect in a linear probability model to capture the
e¤ect of all time-invariant country-pair factors such as common language and colonial ties.25
The estimates are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.26 FTA relationships with
third countries continue to have a statistically signicant and expected impact on countries
incentives to establish FTAs. For example, relative to the benchmark case where there are
no FTAs with third countries, countriesprobability of entering into an FTA is 11 percentage
points higher when they have existing FTAs with the same third country. In comparison to
the estimates without the country pair xed e¤ect reported by either the logit model in Table
2 or a comparable linear probability model, the estimated e¤ect of existing FTA relationships
is larger when we control for all country-pair characteristics.
Next we address the possibility that a countrys unobserved characteristics, such as trade
policy, may drive both the countrys existing FTA relationships and its incentives to form
future FTAs. To this end, we include a vector of country-period and partner-period dummies
in addition to the country-pair xed e¤ect. The results are reported in the last column of Table
4. Again, we nd signicant third-country e¤ects even though the e¤ect of other variables
25Again, a probit model is not used to avoid the incidental parameter problem that arises in the presence of
xed e¤ects. A xed-e¤ect logit model is not an option either, because it functions as a conditional logit model
and excludes all the groups (for example, country pairs in the case of a country-pair xed e¤ect) that have a
constant value of the dependent variable. This would restrict our sample to country pairs that formed an FTA
in the sample period and drop all the pairs that did not enter into an FTA.
26Note that the estimates in the linear probability model have di¤erent interpretations than those reported
directly by the logit model. The former represent the marginal e¤ect of the explanatory variables on the
probability, i.e., the change in the probability given an innitesimal change in each explanatory variable.
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becomes less important. For example, country pairs that share common FTA partners are 9
percentage points more likely to enter into an FTA.
[Table 4 about here]
5.2 The causal e¤ect of existing FTA relationships
To address the concern of causality between existing and future FTAs, we take a quasi-natural
experimental approach by considering only the e¤ect of existing agreements that involve more
than two participating countries, also referred to as plurilateral agreements, on the probability
of two countries forming a bilateral FTA. Two rationales motivate this approach. First, rel-
ative to the decision of two countries to establish a bilateral FTA, the decision to establish a
plurilateral agreement, such as the FTAs between the EU and other countries and the ASEAN,
is less likely to be driven by an individual countrys incentive to reach a future FTA with an
outsider. Second, many plurilateral agreements, such as the ASEAN and Andean FTAs, may
be considered predetermined because of their long history.27
Since this approach does not consider the e¤ect of existing bilateral agreements, country
pairs that have only bilateral FTA partners are excluded from the analysis. Table 5 reports the
results. The e¤ect of sharing common FTA partners remains similar to the previous estimates,
but countries have a lower probability of entering into an FTA when one of them has existing
plurilateral FTAs with third countries. This is not surprising, since a countrys potential prot
gain in a foreign market is expected to decrease in that markets number of FTA partners.
In other words, the concession erosion e¤ect described in Section 2 increases in the number
of third countries that already have existing preferential market access to the export market.
This adverse e¤ect is, however, smaller when the third countries have relatively high unit labor
costs, a result consistent with Table 3.
[Table 5 about here]
6 Predicting the FTAs
In this section, we follow Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and examine how well the empirical
model predicts the actual data. In particular, to what extent does taking account of existing
FTA relationships with third countries improve predictive ability? To investigate this question,
we obtain the tted probabilities of two countries forming an FTA in a given period by rst
27 In Chen and Joshi (2009), we also employed a matching technique to address the causality between two
countries having an FTA with the same third country and their decision to form an agreement with each
other. We found that country pairs that share a common FTA partner are signicantly more likely to reach an
agreement than pairs that have similar economic characteristics but do not actually have existing FTAs with a
common third country.
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excluding, and then controlling for, the e¤ect of existing FTA relationships.28 In the context of
qualitative choice models, higher predicted probabilities of establishing an FTA are associated
with greater predicted welfare gains. Like Baier and Bergstrand (2004), we consider all the
country pairs for which the predicted probability of entering into an FTA in a given period
exceeds 50 percent. However, while Baier and Bergstrand (2004) examine countriesprobability
of having an FTA by 1996, we predict both the existence and timing of FTAs.
We rst exclude the third-country FTA variables. The associated predictions are summa-
rized in the left panel of Table 6. The empirical model successfully predicts the formation of 45
percent (136) of the 304 agreements established between 1991 and 2005. For the remaining 55
percent (168 agreements), the tted probabilities in the period in which the agreements were
formed are less than 50 percent. We then control for existing FTAs with third countries. As
shown in the right panel of Table 6, when we include the third-country FTA e¤ects, the percent-
age of successfully predicted agreements rises to 59 percent, representing a 14 percentage-point
(and equivalently 31 percent) increase in predictive ability. Taking into account existing FTA
relationships helps us explain the formation of 43 additional agreements that would not oth-
erwise be predicted by the model. For the remaining 123 agreements, we nd the predicted
welfare gains at the time the agreements were established to be low even after accounting for
third-country e¤ects.
[Table 6 about here]
Our empirical model also predicts that 4 percent (94) of the 2,313 country pairs that did not
have an FTA before 2005 would derive a welfare gain from entering into a bilateral agreement
in 2005. We notice that 32 percent (30) of these 94 country pairs have indeed either signed an
agreement in 2006 or entered into FTA negotiations.29
7 Conclusion
The existing literature has generally viewed the decision to enter into an FTA as a function
of the participating countrieseconomic characteristics alone and ignored the e¤ect of existing
FTAs with third countries. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that third-country
e¤ects play an important role in countries decision to establish new FTAs. Moreover, the
extent of these third-country e¤ects depends crucially on the structure of the existing FTA
relationships.
We rst show theoretically that when one country has an existing FTA with a third country,
the incentive of that country to form a new FTA with a new partner country is unambiguously
28We use the specication adopted in the last column of Table 5.
29The free trade agreements that were signed in 2006 were obtained from Tuck Trade Agreements Data-
base. Those that are currently in the process of negotiation were compiled from online sources such as
www.bilaterals.org.
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stronger compared to a benchmark case of no pre-existing FTA. However, the incentive for
the potential partner country to join the agreement is strictly lower than the benchmark case,
if the potential partner does not have an FTA in place with the third country. This result
arises from the distinctive e¤ects of the third country on the country pair. For the country
that already has an existing FTA with the third country, the potential loss in its home market
from forming a new FTA will be smaller thanks to the third country. For the country without
an existing FTA, the potential gain in the export market from forming a new FTA will be
smaller, also because of the third country. An FTA will therefore be jointly supported only if
the country with an existing FTA has a relatively large market size and high marginal cost so
that the new partner country can still receive su¢ cient gains in export prot. This hypothesis
is broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.
Our theoretical results also suggest that the incentives of two countries to form an FTA
with each other are unambiguously greater when they both have FTAs with the third country.
This hypothesis again is supported empirically. The empirical ndings remain robust when we
address the potential concerns of omitted variables and reverse causality between existing and
future FTAs.
Based on the empirical evidence, we nd that accounting for third-country e¤ects signif-
icantly raises the predictive ability of the empirical model. Taking into account the existing
FTA relationships helps to increase the number of successfully predicted FTAs by 31 percent.
Our analysis of third-country e¤ects can be extended in two directions. First, countries
decision to establish more than one FTA at a time can be explored. It is possible that some
FTAs considered in isolation are not benecial to the country but would be if they were formed
jointly. This type of interdependence has not been examined in the literature and poses an
interesting area for future research. Second, this paper considered the potential for reverse
causality between existing and future FTAs. However, this topic can be further explored both
theoretically and empirically. Studies that allow countries to take a far-sighted view of FTA
formation have the potential to deepen our understanding of how FTAs evolve over time.
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Appendix 1: Country Coverage (sorted by GDP per capita in 2005)
Luxembourg, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Ireland, Denmark, United States, Sweden,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Finland, Austria, Belgium, Japan, France, Canada, Germany,
Australia, Italy, Singapore, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Spain, Greece, Israel, Slovenia, Por-
tugal, South Korea, Malta, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Mexico, Poland, Lithuania,
Chile, Latvia, Turkey, Venezuela, Malaysia, Russian Federation, Uruguay, South Africa, Mau-
ritius, Panama, Brazil, Argentina, Costa Rica, Romania, Bulgaria, Colombia, Algeria, Tunisia,
Peru, Ecuador, El Salvador, Thailand, Jordan, Guatemala, Morocco, Ukraine, China, Armenia,
Honduras, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Philippines, Bolivia, India, Pakistan, Kenya, Kyrgyz
Republic, Bangladesh, Uganda, Nepal, Malawi, Ethiopia
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Figure 1: Time trends in free trade agreements
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Figure 2: FTA relationships with a third country
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Figure 3: The e¤ect of sharing common FTA partners on the probability of forming an FTA
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Table 2: Third-country e¤ects on the formation of FTAs
Dependent variable: H0 (1) (2) (3) (4)
decision to form an FTA
country-pair average GDP + 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.34*** 0.33***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
country-pair abs. di¤. in GDP  -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.16***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
country-pair abs. di¤. in unit labor cost + 0.23** 0.27* -0.10 -0.06
(0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
country-pair sq. di¤. in unit labor cost  -0.02* -0.02* 0.005 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
country-pair distance  -1.33*** -1.45*** -1.21*** -1.33***
(0.12) (0.27) (0.12) (0.26)
third countriesrelative unit labor cost +/ -6.96*** -6.02*** -4.88*** -1.68*
(2.14) (2.07) (2.14) (0.85)
third countriesdistance +/ -0.01 0.001 0.007 0.04*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
existing FTA relationships: one-FTA case +/ -0.62 -1.18
(2.38) (2.27)
 country-pair di¤. in GDP + 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.03) (0.03)
 country-pair di¤. in unit labor cost + 0.10* 0.09*
(0.06) (0.05)
 country-pair distance  0.14 0.19
(0.30) (0.29)
existing FTA relationships: two-FTA case + 1.13*** 1.16***
(0.14) (0.15)
controls for customs union no yes yes yes
number of observations 12675 12675 12675 12675
Log-likelihood -1190.7 -1183.9 -1160.1 -1140.3
Notes: (i) Logit estimates are reported in the table; (ii) Standard errors are reported
in the parentheses and clustered at the country pair level; (iii) ***, **, and * represent
statistical signicance at, respectively, 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 3: E¤ect of third-country characteristics
Dependent variable: H0 (1) (2) (3)
decision to form an FTA
existing FTA relationships: one-FTA case +/ -0.43 -1.92
(2.33) (2.41)
 country-pair di¤. in GDP + 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.03) (0.03)
 country-pair di¤. in unit labor cost + 0.07* 0.12*
(0.04) (0.07)
 country-pair distance  0.25 0.45
(0.29) (0.31)
 third countriesGDP +/ 0.16*** 0.09***
(0.03) (0.03)
 third countriesrelative unit labor cost + 0.18*** 0.56***
(0.09) (0.19)
 third countriesdistance +/ -0.73*** -0.55***
(0.10) (0.11)
existing FTA relationships: two-FTA case + 5.14 4.68
(4.58) (4.64)
 third countriesGDP +/ -0.10 -0.18
(0.11) (0.12)
 third countriesrelative unit labor cost +/ 1.07*** 0.95***
(0.30) (0.32)
 third countriesdistance +/ -0.15 0.17
0.37 (0.36)
full set of controls yes yes yes
number of observations 12675 12675 12675
Log-likelihood -1141.1 -1101.0 -1035.9
Notes: (i) Logit estimates are reported in the table; (ii) Standard errors are
reported in the parentheses and clustered at the country pair level; (iii) ***, **,
and * represent statistical signicance at, respectively, 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis: omitted variables
Dependent variable: H0 (1) (2)
decision to form an FTA
country-pair average GDP + 0.06*** -0.04
(0.02) (0.03)
country-pair abs. di¤. in GDP  -0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
country-pair abs. di¤. in unit labor cost + 0.01** 0.02**
(0.005) (0.01)
country-pair sq. di¤. in unit labor cost  -0.001* -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
country-pair distance   
third countriesrelative unit labor cost +/ 0.13 44.09
(0.13) (34.73)
third countriesdistance +/  
existing FTA relationships: one-FTA case +/ 0.37*** 0.36***
(0.09) (0.11)
 country-pair di¤. in GDP + 0.006*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
 country-pair di¤. in unit labor cost + 0.003* 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002)
 country-pair distance  -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.001) (0.01)
existing FTA relationships: two-FTA case + 0.11*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01)
controls for customs union yes yes
country-pair dummies yes yes
country (partner)-period dummies no yes
number of observations 12675 12675
R square 0.07 0.24
Notes: (i) Linear probability estimates are reported in the table; (ii)
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses and clustered at
the country pair level; (iii) ***, **, and * represent statistical
signicance at, respectively, 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis: the e¤ect of plurilateral agreements on bilateral FTAs
Dependent variable: H0 (1) (2) (3) (4)
decision to form a bilateral FTA
existing FTA relationships: one-FTA case +/ -0.11** -0.11** -0.13**
(plurilateral) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
 country-pair di¤. in GDP + -0.0001 -0.0001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 country-pair di¤. in unit labor cost + 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
 country-pair distance  0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
existing FTA relationships: two-FTA case + 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
Full set of controls yes yes yes yes
country-pair dummies no no no yes
country (partner)-period dummies no no no yes
number of observations 11197 11197 11197 11197
R square 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.11
Notes: (i) Linear probability estimates are reported in the table; (ii) Standard errors
are reported in the parentheses and clustered at the country pair level; (iii) ***, **,
and * represent statistical signicance at, respectively, 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Table 6: Predicting the FTAs
without third-country e¤ects with third-country e¤ects
Prediction Actual Prediction Actual
FTAijt=1 FTAijt=0 FTAijt=1 FTAijt=0
FTAijt=1 0.45 0.06 FTAijt=1 0.59 0.04
FTAijt=0 0.55 0.94 FTAijt=0 0.41 0.96
Total 1.00 1.00 Total 1.00 1.00
Notes: The cells represent the percentage of observations for which FTAijt=1 or 0
are predicted to have FTAijt=1 or 0 with higher than 0.5 probability.
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